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Information and the Indian State: A
Genealogy
Biswarup Sen
1 The concept of “information” has been at the heart of  notions about citizenship in
contemporary societies. For example, in one of the world’s oldest modern democracies
—the United States—the very process of democracy was considered to hinge on the
ability of  the nation to count and tabulate the entirety of  its  citizens (Lepore 2018,
Koopman 2019). As Michel Foucault (1975) seminally argued the passage to modernity
is characterized by the rise of bio-power, that is, by the tendency of the modern state to
think of its citizenry as a “population” that needs to be comprehended and governed by
means of an emerging technology of information. While Foucault’s writings were most
directly  concerned  with  the  rise  of  modern  statecraft  in  Western  Europe,  it  is  the
central idea of this paper that the notion of information-based governmentality is also
crucial to an understanding of developing and emerging societies. In what follows, I
offer a genealogy of information and statehood in India by examining how information
as  a  category  was  brought  into  play  in  successive  stages  of  contemporary  Indian
history.  The  entire  “modern”  era,  I  suggest,  is  one  in  which  information  is  a  key
constituent of state formation, national identity and political philosophy. I begin the
paper  with  a  discussion  of  the  Aadhaar  card,  a  contemporary  attempt  to  uniquely
identify every citizen of the country by means of an informational device. This first
section  provides  a  broad  account  of  the  creation  of  the  Aadhaar  card  and  briefly
reviews  the  controversies it  has  generated.  The  purpose  of  this  exercise  is  not  to
provide a comprehensive or definitive account of all the issues at stake here, but rather
to highlight the fact that in this “informational age” it is impossible to think the notion
of  citizenship  without  its  informational  correlates.  It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to
conclude that such a perspective is entirely novel. In the next three sections of the
paper, I  try to provide historical snapshots that illustrate information’s constitutive
role  in  previous  versions  of  the  Indian  state.  The  second section  looks  at  the  role
information played in British India and suggests that data collection and management
was  crucial  to  the  colonial  government  as  a  means of  apprehending and ruling its
subjects. The third section examines the nationalist phase in pre-independence India
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and  proposes  that  information  animates  the  freedom  struggle  by  functioning  as
speculative category that dreams and thinks the nation. In other words, if the colonial
powers continuously “mined” information for their mission of imperial rule, facts and
figures would be equally valuable in allowing nationalism to conceptualize what the
future  free  India  would  approximate  to.  The  fourth  section  looks  at  the  pre-
liberalization period of postcolonial history to trace how information becomes a state
“good” that is  both strictly controlled and sparsely disseminated while at the same
time acting as a spur to a specialized sort of economic activity. In short, between 1947
and  1991,  information  becomes  subsumed  under  the  aegis  of  statist  development.
Finally, in the fifth and concluding section of the paper, I revisit the implications of the
Aadhaar card in particular and of informational governance in general, by placing both
in the context of contemporary political and administrative developments. 
2 A note on methodology: this paper is an interpretive exercise that attempts to elucidate
the various meanings and uses of information over a broad sweep of Indian history. It is
based less on primary research than on an analysis of broad trends of governmental
practices and discourses that describe and categorize different stages of informational
statecraft. This analysis is based on academic scholarship on the topic as well as on
journalistic reports and commentaries. The paper’s contribution lies, I hope, in coming
up  with  a  theoretical  framework  that  helps  us  better  understand  the  central  role
played by information in enabling successive moments of the Indian state—the colonial
regime, the nationalist movement, the postcolonial period, and the new millennium.
The account I provide is more genealogy than history in the sense that I don’t provide a
single narrative that seamlessly recounts the development of the idea of information,
but  rather  demonstrate  the specific  forms of  conjunction between information and
governmentality that are generated in particular social moments or spaces. My analysis
is based on four guiding metaphors which I believe succinctly capture the central role
that information plays in the operations of the social forms I am looking at: the colonial
social formation was characterized by information as extrapolation; for the nationalist
movement  information  functioned  as  imagination;  in  the  postcolonial  period
information  was  equivalent  to  domination;  and  finally,  in  the  age  of  Aadhaar
information is societal. 
 
Founding Aadhaar
3 The informational impulse behind the philosophy of governance in contemporary India
is  most  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  Aadhaar  card,  a  document  bearing  a  unique
identification number  for  every  resident  of  the  country.  Aadhaar—the word means
“foundation”  in  many  Indian  languages—is  a  biometric  device  that  links  each
individual’s identification number to their fingerprints and to their iris scan. Launched
in 2009,  the Aadhaar initiative has,  according to official  claims,  enrolled 1.2  billion
individuals in the space of a few years. Even if this figure is not wholly accurate, this
effort is a remarkable achievement given the size and complexity of its constituency.
The  creation  of  the  Aadhaar  project  underlines  the  Indian  state’s  turn  to  an
informational model of society and its firm resolve to use digital  technology in the
interests  of  governance.  While  such a  shift  has  become highly  evident  in  this  new
millennium, this paper will argue that the fusion of information and statecraft has a
long history that spans both the colonial and postcolonial periods. 
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4 The roots of the Aadhaar card lie in anxieties concerning national security. After the
1999 Kargil War with Pakistan, a review committee headed by the noted defense expert
K. Subrahmanyam recommended that villagers living in border areas be provided with
an identity card to ensure greater security.  The idea was strongly endorsed by the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government then in power, which announced that it would
soon create a “multi-purpose national identity card” to be issued first to villagers living
near the border with Pakistan and then to others as well.  The BJP government was
voted out of power in 2004 and succeeded by a less overtly paranoid coalition led by the
Congress party, but the idea of an informational tool that would identify the entire
citizenry of the nation did not die. The rationale for such an initiative had however
changed. As the founding document of the Unique Identification Authority of India put
it, “In India, an inability to prove identity is one of the biggest barriers preventing the
poor from accessing benefits and subsidies. Public as well as private sector agencies
across the country typically require proof of identity before providing individuals with
services. But to date, there remains no nationally accepted, verified identity number
that both residents and agencies can use with “ease and confidence.” (UIDAI 2009) In
other words, a unique identity card for every resident in the country was required not
because it would prevent illegal infiltration across the country’s borders, but because it
would  enable  efficient  delivery  of  welfare  services.  Thus  was  born  “AADHAAR,”  a
unique  identity  number,  “through which  the  citizen  can  claim  his/her  rights  and
entitlements when assured of equal opportunities, as symbolized by the logo, which has
the halo of the Sun on the imprint of a thumb” (Balchand 2010).
5 There was considerable truth in the assertion that India lacked an identity system that
would facilitate the disbursement of welfare goods and services. Thus in 2008, a year
before  Aadhaar  was  launched,  only  40  million  Indians  possessed  passports.  The
corresponding figures for the PAN card (Permanent Account Number), ration card and
voter  ID  card  were  70  million,  220  million  and  500  million  respectively  (Reach
Project 2017). The identity system was not only fractured, it was also dysfunctional in
the sense that forms of proof that were widely accepted (passports, PAN) were held by
very few, while those held by many—ration cards, NREGA (National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act) cards and voter ID cards—were of limited utility. For example, many
individuals were unable to use these cards outside of  the state in which they were
issued. Moreover, both ration cards and NREGA cards were issued to families rather
than  individuals,  thus  making  access  to  these  documents  very  contingent.  As  the
document  laying  out  the  justification  for  Aadhaar  project  pointed  out,  the
consolidation  of  various  forms  of  identity  into  one  single  instrument  would  have
manifold benefits: 
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There  are  clearly,  immense  benefits  from  a  mechanism  that  uniquely
identifies a person,  and ensures instant identity verification.  The need to
prove identity only once will bring down transaction costs for the poor. A
clear identity number would also transform the delivery of social  welfare
programs by making them more inclusive of communities now cut off from
such  benefits  due  to  their  lack  of  identification.  It  would  enable  the
government to shift from indirect to direct benefits, and help verify whether
the intended beneficiaries actually receive funds/subsidies. A single,
universal identity number will also be transformational in eliminating fraud
and duplicate identities, since individuals will no longer be able to represent
themselves differently to different agencies.  This will  result  in significant
savings to the state exchequer (UIDAI 2009:1).
6 The intention to create a unitary identity system that would be pro-poor made sense in
an environment where roughly 70 percent of the population lived in rural areas and
270 million Indians, roughly one in five, were poor according to World Bank measures.
Further, approximately 400 million of India’s workforce are internal migrants (Reach
Project 2017).  Once migrants move from their original place of domicile,  it  becomes
hard for them to obtain identificatory documents that would enable them to obtain
government  services.  This  migrant  population  would  benefit  immensely  from  a
standardized document that would enable them to access a whole range of services and
resources.  An  additional  advantage  of  Aadhaar  comes  from  linkages  that  can  be
established between the UID and other governmental instruments thus expediting the
disbursements  of  due  benefits.  Take  the  case  of  NREGA,  the  social  program  that
guarantees rural households a minimum amount of paid work. In Vijayawada, Andhra
Pradesh, the delivery of NREGA wages used to take 20 to 30 days to reach a household.
Government officials in Andhra Pradesh have found that since individuals have been
able to link NREGA to their Aadhaar number, those same wages are now delivered in
three  to  four  days  (Reach  Project 2017).  At  the  same  time,  the  card  would  benefit
private  industry  by  helping  to  create  a  smoother  environment  for  capital.  Nandan
Nilekani, the software leader who was appointed as the first Chairman of the UIDAI,
argued that Aadhaar would enable the average citizen to open a bank account in a
smooth and quick manner thus building a bridge between capital and citizenry. As Visa
card’s Uttam Nayak stated, “If 600 million Aadhaar holders get bank accounts India can
leapfrog  from a  banking  penetration  of  24  per  cent  to  the  75  percent  common in
developed  countries  like  the  US.  Simultaneously,  we  can  go  from  3  percent
‘electronification’  to  40–50  percent.  That  is  unprecedented  in  the  world”
(Dharmakumar 2013). The case for the Aadhaar card was perhaps most succinctly made
by  the  founding  UIDAI  document:  “India  will  be  the  first  country  to  implement  a
biometric-based unique ID system for its residents on such a large scale. The UID will
serve as  a  universal  proof  of  identity,  allowing residents  to  prove their  credentials
anywhere in the country. It will give the government a clear view of India’s population,
enabling it to target and deliver services effectively, achieve greater returns on social
investments, and track money and resource flows across the country” (UIDAI 2009). 
7 Aadhaar is not without its vociferous critics.  Nikhil  Dey, a prominent social activist
described the UDI as, “the opposite of RTI [Right to Information]. We fought all these
years to have government information made public; and now the government will have
access to every act of every citizen and it’ll be kept secret”, while another activist, Usha
Ramanathan, alleges that, “such initiatives exemplify how the Indian state is currently
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collecting  biometric  data  from  citizens  without  a  law,  simply  because  no  one  is
stopping  them”  (Dharmakumar  et al 2013).Again,  other  RTI  activists  like  Shailesh
Gandhi worry that the Aadhaar project directly hurts the principles and practices of
the Right to Information Act (Gandhi 2017). Several commentators have pointed out the
potential anti-democratic consequences of a unique identity system. For example, Basil
Mathew (2014)  observes  that  India  has  launched  many  projects  like  the  Criminal
Tracking Network and Systems (CTNS), the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)
and the Central Monitoring System (CMS), all of which were established unilaterally
without the permission of Parliament and constitute serious intrusions into the privacy
of citizens. Mathew also points out that in this neoliberal era, the linking of Aadhaar
with private entities constitutes a grave risk of malpractice with data collected for the
purposes of UID leaking out into other hands. In her study of the social life of UID
amongst  Delhi’s  homeless  population,  Ursula  Rao  argues  that  rather  than profiting
from these new technologies, the homeless suffered from their implementation. They
were  often  handicapped  by  not  having  a  permanent  address,  and  very  often  their
bodies  were  “unreadable”  by  the  machinery  of  identification.  In  many  cases,  the
thumbs of the poor and the aged would not yield a thumbprint, a must for the Aadhaar
card. Rao (2013) argues that biometrics is not a neutral technology, but an emerging
technique that “forms at the conjunction between machines, biological bodies, social
habits, and their contexts” (p. 73). Thus, UID is to be seen as a normalizing technology
that “reads and integrates individuals [who are] sufficiently adjusted to a mainstream
social and biological body” (Rao 2013:77). 
8 Aadhaar’s most vocal and persistent critic, Usha Ramanathan (2019), has observed that
“The age of mass surveillance is upon us.” Ramanathan points to the fact that the Home
Ministry has deemed that any information generated, transmitted, received or stored
in any computer resource is of interest to the state. Even more sinisterly, the Indian
government has been conducting secret meetings with representatives of technology
companies like Facebook, Google and Amazon, whose use of data goes well beyond the
needs  of  advertising,  and  often  includes  shady  linkages  with  military  and  defense
establishments. It is with these companies that the Indian government is in discussion
on how to surveil the people of this country. The UID project involves the sharing of
biometric data with companies such as L-1 Solutions which have close links to the CIA.
Equally  disturbing is  the government’s  decision to  set  up a  technology platform to
collect digital chatter in order to create a 360—that is, total—profile of all individuals
who can be classified as internet influencers. UID then is not just a tool for convenient
governance. The manner in which it  is  used has to do “with the future of freedom
itself” (Ramanathan 2019).
9 It is not the purpose of this paper to adjudicate between competing evaluations of the
Aadhaar  initiative.  What  needs  to  be  noted  is  UID’s  universal  appeal  at  the
governmental level—it was first conceived of in the aftermath of the Kargil war by the
BJP leadership as early as 1999, established by the Congress-led UPA government in
2009, and fully implemented by the BJP government that came to power in 2014. Today,
under the re-elected leadership of Narendra Modi, Aadhaar is an established feature of
the  bureaucratic  landscape.  The  only  debates  surrounding  it  pertain  to  the  card’s
limits: that is, to what extent the card is necessary for the transaction of services and
business. Thus, in September of 2018, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that Aadhaar is
constitutional in the sense that it does not violate an individual’s right to privacy when
that  individual  agrees  to  share  biometric  data.  It  further  ruled  that  Aadhaar  is
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mandatory for filing income taxes or for obtaining a PAN (permanent account number).
On the other hand, it struck down Article 57 of the Aadhaar Act, as a consequence of
which  no  private  company  or  entity  can  seek  an  Aadhaar  card  number  from  any
individual for the purpose of doing business (liveMint 2018).
10 The Aadhaar card is here to stay and that is because the Indian state, as it exists now, is
an  entity  characterized  by  a  strong  commitment  to  the  complete  integration  of
information  technology  and  governmental  practices.  From  the  perspective  of  this
paper,  the  Aadhaar  project  symbolizes  the  fourth  of  my  guiding  metaphors  for
conceptualizing such a relationship—information as societal. In this latest iteration, the
concept of information is deemed to be foundational to the very formation of society
itself, an idea that I will explore a little more thoroughly in the concluding part of the
paper.
 
Information in the Colonial Regime
11 In the autumn of 1858, a young British civil servant named William Herschel, serving at
the time in the north Bengal district of Maldah, entered into a contract for the supply
of road-making material with a local businessman called Rajyadhar Konai. As Konai was
preparing to sign the contractual document in the traditional way—in the upper right
hand corner—Herschel, who had come to “distrust all evidence tendered in Court” and
had come to “despair of any good coming from orders and decisions based on such
slippery  facts”,  decided  on  a sudden  impulse  to  ask  the  contractor  to  stamp  the
contract with a print of his right hand (Sengoopta 2003:57). Thus was born the idea of
the fingerprint,  an impression that  recorded an individual  in the form of  unvarying
ridge-pattern data taken from the finger.  A successor of  Hershcel’s,  Edward Henry,
further developed Herschel’s revolutionary procedure, and in 1897 announced a system
of fingerprint classification that “the greatest sceptic would be at once convinced of
identity on being shown the original and duplicate impressions” (Sengoopta 2003:139).
The Bengal system of fingerprinting soon spread all over British India and then back
“home” in England, as well as in the rest of the English-speaking world. 
12 The introduction of fingerprinting—still a crucial part of the Aadhaar card’s “operating
system”—as a standard mode of bureaucratic governance points to the crucial role that
was  played  by  information  in  the  constitution  of  the  colonial  state.  As  numerous
scholars  have  demonstrated,  the  entire  colonial  period  was  marked  by  a  series  of
efforts at generating information that would produce a comprehensive “knowledge” of
the territory and its  peoples.  The entire  history of  colonialism is  dotted with such
epistemological projects: narratives of the conquered nation written by such notable
authors as Alexander Dow (1772; An Enquiry into the State of Bengal), James Mill (1817; The
History of British India)1 and James Tod (1832; Annals and Antiquities of Rajast’han); surveys
of  the  land  conducted  by  geographers  like  William  Lambton  (1802;  The  Great
Trigonometric  Survey)  and  James  Rennell  (1779;  Bengal  Atlas)  Colin  Mckenzie  (1799;
Mysore  Survey)  and  Frances  Buchanan;  the  recovery  and  recodification  of  native
language, literature, law and lore compiled by Orientalists like Thomas Munro, William
Jones (1796; Institutes of Hindu Law) and N.B. Halhed (1776; A Code of Gentoo Laws ). What
lay behind this unbounded thirst for information? In the words of one distinguished
commentator,  such enterprises  were  undertaken in  order  “to  enable  the  British  to
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classify,  categorize,  and  bound the  vast  social  world  that  was  India  so  it  could  be
controlled” (Cohn 1996:4–5). 
13 Such  an  observation  stems  from  a  distinctive  historiography  of  colonialism.  If
traditional Marxist scholarship analyzed colonialism as a unique mode of production
that arises in “the last stage of capitalism”2 Michel Foucault’s distinctive account of
modernity allows us to read colonialism not only in economic terms, but also as a mode
of governance that imposes knowledge, precepts and rules upon a subject population in
order to make the colonial project viable. In a well-known essay, the anthropologist
David Scott (1995) has argued that we attend to the “political  rationalities of  colonial
power”  that  “characterize  those  ways  in  which  colonial  power  is  organized  as  an
activity  designed  to  produce  effects of  rule”  (p.193).  Following  Foucault’s  (2001)
observation that “Maybe what is really important for our modernity—that is for our
present—is  not  so  much  the  statization  [etatisation] of  society,  as  the
“governmentalization” of the state” (p.220), Scott (1995) rethinks colonialism in terms
of  a  “colonial  governmentality”  that  sets  up  the  very  terms  and  logic  of  societal
discourse  “so  as  to  produce  not  so  much  extractive-effects  on  colonial  bodies  as
governing-effects on colonial conduct” (p.204).
14 The notion of  colonial  governmentality  is  indispensable  for  a  full  understanding of
colonialism. If governmentality was the defining feature of the modern European state,
it had an even stronger salience in the colonial context. Imposed by military methods
on an alien population, and dedicated to crude extraction and unfair imperial trade, the
colonial state could scarcely turn to notions of sovereignty and the natural order as the
basis  for  its  rule.  Its  hold  and  legitimacy  could  therefore  only  be  established  by
reorganizing its human territory by means of the conceptual apparatus and strategic
tactics that embodied the guiding ideas and principles of western modernity. In other
words, the constitutive logic of the colonial state implied that it was “governmental”
from the very moment of its inception. Consequently, the Indian colonial state, first as
Company  Bahadur  and  then  as  the  British  Raj,  could  sustain  itself  and  evolve  by
expanding  the  scope  of  this  governmentality.  One  can  map  this  endeavor,  as
Scott (1995) suggests, by looking at the targets of colonial power—where it was applied
and the means and instrumentalities deployed—as well as the field of its operation—or
as Scott puts it the “zone” it constructs for its functionality (p.193). In other words,
colonial power is used not only at the levels of material goods and human population,
but  in  a  discursive  zone  as  well,  since  the  exercise  of  colonial  governmentality
depended  crucially  on  a  ceaseless  process  of  information  gathering,  information
processing, and information distribution. There is by now a vast amount of literature—
in fields such as historiography, social statistics, mapping, legal studies, literary studies
and  aesthetics—that  critically  examines  this  process  as  it  unfolded  and  that  ably
demonstrates the creation of a “discourse” that provided the cognitive underpinning
for  colonialism  as  a  political  and  economic  phenomenon.  To  sum  up,  the  colonial
regime needed information as a means of governance of its body of subjects. The gap
between the colonizer and colonized, called for a specific mode of knowledge (of which
anthropology is a prime example) that maintained difference while facilitating a very
specific mode of domination. Whereas Aadhaar collects biometric information in order
to essentially define and capture the “citizen,” the colonial drive for information is
vaster in its scope; it seeks to know “everything” about its subjects if only because it
fears them to be unknowable. 
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Information and Nationalist Thought
15 Nationalism in the colonial  context is  usually thought of  as a political  process that
challenges the moral authority of colonial rule, argues for self-rule, launches freedom
struggles  and  eventually  succeeds  in  transforming  the  colonial  state  into  a  free
postcolonial nation. I would like to suggest that nationalism is also an epistemological
project;  one  that  redefines  what  can  or  should  be  known  in  order  to  establish  a
legitimate nation. Nationalist thought is an exercise in virtuality; it uses information to
imagine a nation that would come to fruition at the moment of independence. Virtual
nationalism dwelt in the realm of the potential, and expressed itself through a series of
blueprints,  projections, resolves and resolutions that calculated and calibrated what
was yet  to  be.  Planning,  understood as  “informed futurity”,  that  is,  an activity  that
imagines the future on the basis of information regarding the present was the manifest
form of virtual nationalism as it has just been defined. Not surprisingly then, planning
played an important role in the nationalist movement, and was to play an even more
significant role in the destiny of postcolonial India. 
16 The years immediately before 1947 saw a succession of “plans” that were blueprints for
developing  the  independent  nation  that  was  already  visible  on  the  horizon.  The
Resolution  of  Fundamental  Rights  and Economic  Programme passed  at  the  Karachi
Congress  held  in  1931 is  perhaps  the  very  first  document  of  this  sort.  Though not
technically  a  “plan,”  the  sentiments  expressed in  the  Resolution certainly  assumed
state planning as the fundamental component of the future economy. Thus, it declared
that in the age of Swaraj,  “the State shall  provide free and compulsory education…
safeguard the interests of industrial workers…protect indigenous industries” and “shall
own or control key industries and services,  mineral resources,  railways,  waterways,
shipping and other means of public transport” (National Planning Committee 1988:31–
33) The Karachi Resolution presaged a flood of similar publications: In 1934, the noted
economist Sir M. M. Visvesvarya published his Planned Economy for India,  followed in
1935 by N.S. Subba Rao’s Some Aspects of Economic Planning. At the behest of its President
Netaji  Subhas  Chandra  Bose,  the  Congress  party  constituted  a  National  Planning
Committee under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Committee, formed in
1938, would release several reports in the next few years, many authored by Nehru
himself.  In  1944 a  group of  industrialists  that  included two of  India’s  most  famous
business leaders—J.R. D. Tata and G.D. Birla—released “The ‘Bombay’ Plan for India’s
Economic Development.” The same year also saw the publication of a “People’s Plan”
authored by the radical humanist and ex-communist M.N. Roy on behalf of the Indian
Federation of  Labour.  In  1945,  the government of  India  issued two documents—the
“Second Report on Reconstruction Planning” and the “Industrial Policy Statement”—
both  of  which  outlined  a  vision  for  post-war  India.  Finally,  a  “Gandhian  Plan”  for
India (1949), written by S.N. Aggarwal, was the last such anticipatory document to come
out before planning became a reality in the early fifties with the establishment of the
Planning Commission and the launching of the First Five Year Plan. 
17 These proposals represented very different constituencies of the emerging nation and
one would expect them to have widely divergent prescriptions for development and
growth. But in spite of these differences, all these plans shared a common vision. In his
analysis  of  the national  postcolonial  state,  the eminent postcolonial  theorist  Partha
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Chatterjee (1993)  points  out  that  planning appeared first  and foremost  as  a  form of
determining  state  policy.  Executed  by  “experts,”  planning  “emerged  as  a  crucial
instrumental modality by which the state would determine the material allocation of
productive  resources  within  the  nation:  a  modality  of  political  power  constituted
outside  the  immediate  political  power  itself.”  What  this  implies  is  that  “a
developmental  ideology…was  a  constituent  part  of  the  self-definition  of  the
postcolonial ideology” (pp.202–203).3 I would supplement Chatterjee’s observations by
pointing out that while planning is clearly the key instrument for a “developmental
ideology” it  is  at  the same time the ground for the emergence of  an informational
order. Consider the following definition of planning put forward by a sub-committee of
the National Planning Committee:
What is planning? Planning under a democratic system may be defined as
the  technical  co-ordination,  by  disinterested  experts,  of  consumption,
production, investment, trade and income distribution in accordance with
social objectives set by bodies representative of the nation. Such planning is
not  only  to  be  considered  from  the  point  of  view of  economics  and  the
raising  of  the  standard  of  living,  but  must  include  cultural  and  spiritual
values and the human side of life (National Planning Committee 1988:51).
Defining planning as an activity consisting of “technical co-ordination, by disinterested
experts”  may be  indicative  of  the  emergent  middle-class  “bourgeois”  ideology that
would come to dominate Nehruvian India; but at the same time such a vision unleashes
an informational program that comes to strongly influence and characterize the nature
of the postcolonial formation. In other words, the idea of planning is inconceivable
without the idea of information, and at the same time the project of planning would, as
I discuss in the next section, be directly responsible for India’s information revolution. 
18 Most of the notable nationalist leaders were wholeheartedly committed to the idea of
planning. Jawaharlal Nehru, the face of Indian politics after Gandhi, was the central
figure in this respect. In a note directed at his fellow member on the National Planning
Committee he wrote:
To  realize  the  social  objectives,  the  state  has  to  plan  through  its
representatives…This  planning  will  deal  with  production,  distribution,
consumption, investment, trade, income, social services and the many other
forms of national activity which act and react on each other.  Briefly put,
planning aims at the raising of the material and cultural standard of living of
the people as a whole (Gopal 1980:306). 
In other words, Nehru was calling for a great informational exercise that would cognize
every realm of the economy and society in order to predict and produce the India that
was to come. Such a stance was not restricted to Nehru; his great rival in the Congress
party,  Subhas Bose,  announced that  “when we have a  national  government for  the
whole country,  one of  the first  things we shall  have to do is  to appoint a National
Planning Commission for the whole country” (Bose 1962:54). This rhetoric is unchanged
almost a hundred years later—the Aadhaar card according to an advisory committee set
up  at  the  time  of  its  launch  is  characterized  by  an  “anytime,  anywhere,  anyhow”
authentication ability that “will provide the user universality of usage across service
providers, across the country” (Aadhaar, Communicating to a Billion, 2010).  For the
pre-Independence  Congress  party  and  the  Aadhaar  Advisory  Committee  alike,
Information and the Indian State: A Genealogy
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 23 | 2020
9
information gathering and management are the key to economic development and to
social progress.
19 I  want  to  conclude  this  section  by  considering  the  case  of  P.C.  Mahalanobis,  the
principal  architect  of  the Second Five-Year Plan (1951-1961)  and perhaps the single
most influential figure in the history of Indian economic planning. Mahalanobis was a
statistician of international repute and had been responsible for the founding of the
Indian Statistical Institute in 1932, as well as the reputed statistical journal Samkhya,
which was founded in 1933. Like Bose and Nehru, Mahalanobis was yet another key
mid-century figure who believed in the essential unity of science and planning. For him
statistics was “essentially an applied science” that’s “aim is to reach a decision, on a
probabilistic basis, on available evidence” (Mahalanobis 1950:210). This applied science
was therefore at the very heart of planning. In an address to the American Statistical
Association, Mahalanobis drew attention to the governmental benefits of statistics: “It
had its  origin  in  the  counting  of  men or  cattle…the  very  word statistics  shows its
connection with ‘statecraft’.” In as much “It is essential, in underdeveloped countries
to  make  statistics  purposive”  (Mahalanobis 1965:45–46).  Not  only  did  Mahalanobis
found the discipline of statistics in India, in his later role as the chief architect of the
Second Five Year Plan he was instrumental in setting the tone of India’s policy-making
for the next three decades. The primary objective of the Plan was to raise the level of
living in the country by means of “rapid industrialization with particular emphasis on
the  development  of  basic  and  heavy  industries”  (Second  Five  Year  Plan).  The  bias
toward technology would become evident in the push for developing industries like
coal, electricity, iron and steel, and chemicals. There was early recognition on the part
of Mahalanobis and others that information technology was a resource as important as
any  of  the  “heavy”  industries.  Thus,  the  Indian  Statistical  Institute  (ISI),  under
Mahalanobis, built the country’s first analog computer in the early 1950s.4 Recognizing
the need for more advanced technology, Mahalanobis formed a small computer group
at the ISI and ordered a computer from the British Tabulating Machines (BTM) which
was at the time marketing keypunch machines, sorters and mechanical calculators in
India. BTM agreed to sell a computer to the ISI in 1954, though without any technical
support. The ISI was to install and maintain the machine using its own scientists and
engineers. The ISI sent two of its scientists to England to learn the basics of this HEC‐
2M  (Hollerith  Electronic  Computer  Model  2M)  computer.  The  computer  arrived  in
Kolkata  in  July  1955  and  it  started  working  in  August  1955  (Rajaraman 2012).
Mahalanobis  was  a  key  figure  in  that  he  forged  the  path  between  a  mathematical
approach to information processing and a computational  one.  Along with Bose and
Nehru he represents that strain of nationalism for which information gathering and
processing is an integral part of creating a nation.
 
Information in the Post-Colonial State
20 In  this  section,  I  examine  the  role  that  information  played  in  the  years  after
Independence as the Indian state sought to define and develop a just-born nation. This
postcolonial period was characterized by two developments.5 The first was a possessive
attitude and a consequential safeguarding of information relating to matters of state.
This led to a practice of hoarding and locking up information and disseminating it in
small doses, often in the shape of propaganda. Secondly, the Indian government began
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to  acknowledge  the  growing  role  information  and  information  technology  was
beginning to play in the global  economy and started taking discreet  measures that
would enable Indian industry to master and then generate revenue in this sector. 
21 The  nature  of  the  Indian  social  formation  in  the  period  1947-1991  determined the
state’s  stance  towards  communication  and  information.  First,  the  Indian  state  was
firmly committed to a socialist path to development. This meant that the state retained
ownership  of  crucial  capital-intensive  sectors  like  oil,  steel,  railways,  defense
equipment and so on. In particular, the state assumed control over both broadcasting
and telecommunications, including telephony. For example, not only were telephone
lines and exchanges under governmental control, but, the handsets themselves were
manufactured by a public sector company. Secondly, a paternalistic attitude towards
the masses—derived partly from colonial antecedents and partly from still prevalent
feudal  hierarchies  of  caste,  class  and  status—meant  that  communication  and
information were thought of as the exclusive property of the state, to be disseminated
in a manner that could only be determined by officialdom. Thirdly, the developmental
bias of this period meant that attitudes towards communication and information were
marked by extreme frugality.  Thus Nehru—whose personal whimsy often translated
into national policy—saw television as a luxury meant only for the affluent and thus did
little to encourage its growth (Majumdar and Mehta 2012). As a result, television was
inordinately late coming to India, and even during the first two decades after it was
introduced in 1969, television broadcasting remained both skeletal and rudimentary. 
22 The notion that information and communication needed be under the purview of the
state has a long history in the Indian context. As the famous Indian Telegraph Act of
1885  announced  quite  unequivocally,  “Within  [India]  the  Central  Government  shall
have the exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and working telegraphs” (The
Indian  Telegraph  Act 1885:36).  The  scope  of  the  government’s  involvement  with
information and communication was  necessarily  enlarged with  the  advent  of  radio
broadcasting. Although the very first radio broadcasts (1927) in India were made by the
privately-owned  Indian  Broadcasting  Company,  the  venture  failed  and  the  colonial
government  took  over  the  role  of  broadcasting  with  the  formation  of  the  Indian
Broadcasting Service in 1932. The IBS was renamed All India Radio (1936) and was then
placed  under  a  separate  Ministry  of  Information  and  Broadcasting.  In  short,  both
interpersonal communication (by means of post, telegraph and telephone) as well as
mass communications (radio, television) were thought of as informational domains that
need  to  be  subsumed  within  the  state;  either  by  state  ownership  of  channels  of
distribution as in the case of the post, telegraph or telephone, or by control over both
content  and  channel  in  the  case  of  radio  and  television.  In  spite  of  two  notable
exceptions—the  press  and  the  Bollywood  film  industry  which  were  both  privately
financed and subject to the mildest of censorship—it is still legitimate to describe this
period as one in which information (and its communication) was thought of primarily
in statist terms. 
23 To sum up, in the period 1947-1991, the Indian state’s relationship to information was
highly proprietary. Such a top-down informational paradigm can be dubbed as “pre-
modern”  in  the  sense  that  it  did  not  promote,  and  often  actively  blocked,  the
continuous flow of information between private entities that was characteristic of all
advanced capitalist societies. Even while the Indian state strictly controlled both the
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production and distribution of information, it would also begin to embrace the idea of
the information age. 
24 India’s entry into the digital era can be said to have begun in January of 1962, when the
Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, inaugurated the TIFRAC, an indigenously
manufactured  first-generation  mainframe  computer  that  was  meant  to  boost  the
nation’s  scientific  capabilities  (Deccan  Herald 2010).  Named  after  the  prestigious
research institution in which it was housed, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
Automatic  Calculator,  which had been many years  in the making,  would remain in
operation for a mere two years. Its impact on Indian society, however, was incalculable
insofar as it announced the dawning of a new era that would be based on information.
In the immediate aftermath of Independence, state economy policy was heavily biased
in  favor  of  domestic  industry.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Indian  state’s
relationship  with  global  capital  was  far  less  amicable.  Thus,  the  Industrial  Policy
Resolution of 1948, that set the tone for the country’s financial philosophy, held that
foreign  investment  had  to  be  carefully  regulated  in  the  national  interest  and  that
“majority interest in ownership and effective control should always be in Indian hands”
(p. 95) In other words, the postcolonial state’s stance towards capital in general was
both complex and contradictory: abetting and colluding with domestic capital on the
one hand, and hostile and intransigent to global capital on the other. 
25 An analysis of India’s information sector in the Nehruvian period complicates this tidy
dichotomy. As even a cursory glance at the development of the computer industry will
show, contrary to the received wisdom, the postcolonial state was establishing ties with
global  capital  even at  the height of  the autarkic  period.  The post  TIFRAC period is
marked by successive events that demonstrate how the digital domain provides a site
for the postcolonial state’s increasing engagement with global capital: the allowing of
software export, the relaxation of import restrictions, the creation of Special Economic
Zones  (SEZ),  the  institution  of  body  shopping,  the  opening  of  doors  for  foreign
multinationals, and finally the wholesale integration of the software industry into the
global  marketplace.  In  short,  the  saga  of  the  information  sector  in  Nehruvian
postcolonial India both enacts and predicts the large-scale changes brought about by
liberalization. 
26 The trajectory of  the computer industry in the period 1967-1978 can be seen as an
ambiguous period in which the principles of Nehruvian postcoloniality were being both
strengthened  and  diluted  at  the  same  time.  The  establishment  of  the  Electronics
Commission  of  India  Limited  (ECIL,  est. 1970),  an  organization  whose  goal  was  to
develop  an  indigenous  computer  industry,  as  well  as  the  passage  of  strict  foreign
exchange laws that limited the amount of external capital that would be allowed into
the country FERA were in keeping with the state’s avowed mission to create a self-
sufficient society based on socialistic principles. At the same time, however, there was a
realization that these very principles had to be compromised if India was to earn the
revenue  needed  to  address  its  balance  of  payment  problems.  The  most  interesting
development in this regard was the setting up of export processing zones (EPZ) that
would not be subject to the usual tariffs and duties levied on any sort of international
trade. The first such EPZ was opened in 1965 in Kandla, a port town in the state of
Gujarat.  However,  it  is  the  Santa  Cruz  Electronics  Export  Processing  Zone  (SEEPZ),
located in Andheri East, Mumbai, which is of more relevance to this present discussion.
SEEPZ  was  set  up  in  1973  as  single-product  Export  Processing  Zone  that  would
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exclusively  manufacture  and  export  electronic  items,  with  the  objective  “of  (a)
accelerating  the  progress  of  electronics  manufacturing  in  India  and  (b)  to  take
advantage of the growing electronics world market” (Special Economic Zone 2015). 
27 The SEEPZ scheme would be a small but promising way to step up the export sector.
The announcement of  the scheme had the effect  of  enticing the giant US company
Burroughs, which then ranked amongst the top 10 computer companies in the world, to
enter India and set up a joint venture with the fledgling Tata Consulting Services. The
collaboration  with  Burroughs  gave  India’s  software  professionals  an  intimate
knowledge of global business practices and would thus serve as a springboard for the
growth of the entire software industry. In the words of one commentator, “The Indian
software saga...began in SEEPZ Mumbai” (Aggarwal 2006:4533).
28 The Export Processing Zone model gave birth to the phenomenon known, somewhat
notoriously,  as  “bodyshopping”,  which  involved  the  practice  of  sending  software
personnel to the US, UK and other countries to work at onsite on temporary projects.
Bodyshopping dominated the industry in the 1980s,  but would soon be replaced by
offshoring—the  implementation  of  IT  services,  Business  Process  Outsourcing  (BPO),
Software Products and Engineering services from within India would soon become the
main engine for the remarkable growth of the Indian industry. Buoyed by the revenues
generated by offshoring (also known as outsourcing), Indian software exports increased
from EUR 5.93 billion in 2003-2004 to EUR 20.20 billion in 2008-2009, and the industry
saw an astonishing growth rate of almost 25 percent (Malik 2011). 
29 I  want  to  end  this  section  by  briefly  mentioning  two  state  initiatives—the  New
Computer and Software Policies of 1984 and 1986, and the decision to set up of software
technology parks (STPs) in 1990—that further confirm the thesis that the information
sector was the site where the state “rehearsed” its turn to the free market before the
liberalization of 1991. The opening up of the computer industry would be accelerated
by the passage of two policy enactments: The New Computer Policy (NCP) of 1984 and a
policy on software export passed in 1986. The NCP employed a strategy of “flood in,
flood out” (Subramanium 2006:380)—flood the nation with imports and cause a larger
flood of software exports—and eased the availability of computers in India by reducing
the  software  import  tariffs  from  100  percent  to  60  percent.  Within  a  year  of  its
implementation,  computer  production grew by 100  percent,  while  prices  fell  by  50
percent. Software exports too began to increase, and recognizing its huge potential, the
government also introduced a policy on computer software export, development and
training, the objective of which was to “promote software exports to take a quantum
jump and capture a sizable share in the international market” (Sharma 2009:140). 
30 The last development of note that occurred in the computer/software industry before
liberalization was the establishment of Software Technology Parks, which were duty-
free privately managed enterprises that could attract investments and boost exports in
the  software  industry.  The  first  STPs  were  established  in  Bangalore,  Pune  and
Bhubenswar in 1990 and within two decades there were as many as 47 such centers
operating across the country (Vaidyanathan 2008:288). As the noted economist Pulapre
Balakrishnan (2006) has observed, STPs “were to radically transform the environment
for software production in India and thus the Indian IT industry. The STP, by providing
an exclusive state-of-the-art physical site for software production, especially access to
high-speed communication channels,  enabled the Indian IT industry to sidestep the
infra-structure constraint that is stoically faced by the rest of India's manufacturing
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sector…The rise of  the offshore model reflected the rising confidence in the Indian
software firm worldwide” (p.3869). 
31 There is  a  common thread running through the establishment of  Special  Economic
Zones,  the  passage  of  the  minicomputer  and  New  Computer  policies,  and  the
introduction of Software Technology Parks. All these instances collectively symbolize
the  information  sector’s  unique  role  in  mediating  the  relationship  between  the
postcolonial state and capitalist democracy. Information stood at the fault line between
two drives, one demanding that the country be dedicated to a socialist path that would
make the nation autonomous with regard to the world capitalist order, and a second
that called for the adoption of current technological goods and practices in order to
steer the nation into modernity. The second tendency would eventually win out, and
the postcolonial state’s gradual acknowledgement that information was an economic
“good”  had  the  effect  of  loosening  its  proprietary  stance.  This  would,  in  no  small
measure prepare the way for economic liberalization and the beginning of the current
era of informational governance.
 
Conclusion 
32 As the discussion above has demonstrated, the relationship between information and
the state in India has gone through four distinct stages. Under British colonial rule,
information was continuously extracted from the populace, much in the same way as
raw materials and other resources, in order to properly cognize the body politic in the
interests of imperial rule and hopefully turn the population into loyal subjects. For the
nationalist movement that arose at the end of the nineteenth century, information was
an equally prized object, but its role was quite different. Information would help to
dream and plan the nation that was incoming, it was therefore the means to visualize
the citizen of tomorrow in a free India. With Independence, information became the
property  of  the  State,  its  possession  and  distribution  becoming  a  matter  of  great
national importance. Concurrently however, the new information order dissolved the
State’s  commitment  to  autarky  and  helped  to  integrate  India  into  the  new  global
economy that was beginning to take place. The present situation is one in which the
primacy of information in the realm of both economics and governance are taken for
granted.  As Manuel  Castells (2009)  has  argued in his  seminal  writings on the topic,
“Informationalism is the technological paradigm that constitutes the material basis of
early 21st  century societies” (p.9). The Aadhaar card project weaves together the new
conceptions  of  state,  citizenship,  information  and  governance  that  characterize
contemporary Indian politics. 
33 We can achieve a fuller and deeper understanding of this philosophical and political
paradigm by placing the Aadhaar project alongside similar initiatives like the National
Register  of  Citizens  (NRC).  The  NRC is,  in  the  words  of  the  Office  of  the  Registrar
General  &  Census  Commissioner,  India  (2019)  “a  register  of  usual  residents  of  the
country” whose objective is  to provide a comprehensive database of  every resident
using demographic and biometric particulars. The creation of the NRC was mandated
by the Citizenship Act of 1955 (and by its 2003 amendment) but the initiative was not
implemented anywhere until under a Supreme Court order of 2013, the state of Assam
was asked to compile such a register. The final list of the state’s 33 million inhabitants
was released in August 2019, with nearly 2 million residents having failed to make the
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list. Two crucial observations must be made here. First, the central idea behind the NRC
—that every citizen of the nation needs to be enumerated and inscribed—is the same
one that animates the Aadhaar project. Taken together, the two projects embody the
belief that information is societal, meaning not only that society is to be founded on a
bedrock of data but also that social being can only be enacted through informational
devices and processes. Thus, if the NRC provides a “base of data” upon which the nation
stands, the Aadhaar card symbolizes how day to day transactional life is possible only
with the employment of informational tools. 
34 Secondly, the NRC (and its adjunct, the recently passed Citizenship Amendment Act or
CAA)  is  a  striking  illustration  of  how  an  abstract  informational  philosophy  of
citizenship can be put to use in the context of identity politics. Even though the idea of
a  national  register  of  citizens  was  implicit  in  all  pronouncements  about  Indian
citizenship, the only time an actual register was created was immediately after the 1951
census. Quite remarkably, between that year and the release of an NCR report in the
state of Assam in August 2019, there was no attempt to revive the idea of an NCR. The
Indian state was quite content,  it  appears,  to rule and govern, without any explicit
knowledge of its subjects. It is only in the aftermath of the Aadhaar initiative that the
NRC would be revived for one singular case—Assam. Ever since the province of Assam
was created in the years following the Mutiny it has been a contested terrain in terms
of  identity  and ethnic  politics  (Chakravarti 2019).  One major  source  of  conflict  was
migration from neighboring areas, an issue which resulted in the Assam Movement of
1979 demanding expulsion of “illegals.” It is therefore no coincidence that in the de-
secularized climate of the new millennium the Supreme Court of India responded to
two writ petitions filed by non-governmental organizations from Assam and ordered
the  state  and  central  governments  to  update  the  NRC  in  accordance  with  the
Citizenship Act of 1955 and the (amended) Citizenship Rules of 2003. The court’s intent
here  was  to  ensure  that  such  “illegals”,  many  of  whom  came  from  the  minority
community, would both be identified and lose their legitimacy as denizens of the land.
As Ranjit  Samaddar (2018) aptly observes,  “Citizenship and statelessness have never
been so linked as they are today.” After two rounds of  publication of  drafts  of  the
register, a partial one on December 31, 2017 and a final draft on July 30, 2018, the final
list was published on August 31, 2019, with 1.9 million inhabitants of the state being
found  wanting  with  valid  documentation  required  to  establish  their  identities.
(Barbora 2019).  Given  that  half  of  this  undocumented  population  turned  out  to  be
Hindus, the BJP government reacted rapidly by passing the Citizenship Amendment Act
that  granted  legal  status  to  members  of  the  Hindu,  Sikh,  Jain,  Parsi  or  Christian
community  from  the  three  neighboring  countries  of  Bangladesh,  Pakistan  and
Afghanistan who had sought refuge in India.  At  the time of  writing,  India  is  being
convulsed by massive protests against the CAA that have elicited a very brutal response
from the current government in a striking proof of the proposition that information
can get entangled with the most uncivil forms of political conflicts. Designed to account
for every citizen of India and to provide each constituent of the nation with a unique
biometric profile, projects like the Aadhaar card and the NCR offer a new foundation
for citizenship. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, such schemes represent the
convergence between state and capital to reassemble governance around notions of
access, information, and digital consumerism. In other words, the present moment is
witnessing a push to construct a new citizen-subject who will function as a node within
an emergent ecology of information. 
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NOTES
1. Mill’s volume was less an example of information-gathering than of creating an ideological
portrait  of  British  India.  Mill  himself  never  visited  India,  and  wrote  his  book  by  examining
correspondence stored in the India Office in London. I owe this insight to an anonymous reviewer
for this paper.
2. A representative example of the latter approach is the Marxist historian Jairus Banaji’s claim
that “colonialism must be understood in terms of a specific mode of production, neither feudal or
capitalist, though ‘resembling’ both at different levels” (1972). It ought to be pointed out that
such formulations  were  driven by  the  need to  plot  the  Indian  formation within  the  grid  of
historical materialism in order to determine the correct political strategy for the moment.
3. David Ludden (1992) has argued persuasively that even the colonial state can be thought of as a
“development regime” committed to the idea of state-guided progress for the entire citizenry. 
4. In 1955,  the Indian Statistical  Institute imported India’s first  digital  computer,  an HEC-2M
machine  manufactured  by  the  British  Tabulating  Machine  Company.  Two  years  earlier,
researchers at the ISI had built the country’s first analog computer (Sinha 2012).
5. I am using “postcolonial” to designate the period 1947–1991. This may seem arbitrary and even
idiosyncratic. I lack the space to argue for this use, but will merely say that for me the category
of postcoloniality becomes less and less useful as we go beyond liberalization. I prefer to describe
(and analyze) 1991to the present as contemporary rather than postcolonial.
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The category of information has been at the heart of notions about citizenship and governance in
all modern societies. This paper constructs a genealogy of information and statehood in India by
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examining how information as a governing idea was brought into play in successive stages of
contemporary Indian history. This first section provides a broad account of the creation of the
Aadhaar  card  project—that  attempts  to  uniquely  identify  every  citizen  in  the  country—and
briefly reviews the controversies it  has generated. The second portion of the paper provides
historical  snapshots that illustrate information’s constitutive role in previous versions of the
Indian  state.  Thus,  the  second  section  looks  at  the  role  information  played  in  constituting
colonial government, while the next section examines the nationalist phase in pre-independence
India  to  suggest  that  information  functioned  as  speculative  category  that  allowed  freedom
fighters to dream and think the nation.  In the fourth section I  look at the pre-liberalization
period of  postcolonial  history to trace how information becomes a state “good” that is  both
strictly  controlled  and  sparsely  disseminated  while  at the  same  time  acting  as  a  spur  to  a
specialized sort of economic activity. Finally, in the fifth and concluding section of the paper, I
analyze information’s role in emerging India by revisiting the implications of the Aadhaar card in
particular  and  of  informational  governance  in  general,  by  placing  both  in  the  context  of
contemporary political and administrative developments like the National Population Register
and the Citizenship Amendment Act. 
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